

The Evil Friend in Your Browser

Abstract

On the one hand, browser extensions, e.g., for Chrome, are very useful, as they extend web browsers with additional functionality (e.g., blocking ads). On the other hand, they are the most dangerous code that runs in your browsers: extension can read and modify both the content displayed in the browser. As they also can communicate with any web-site or web-service, they can report both data and metadata to external parties. The current security model for browser extensions seems to be inadequate for expressing the security or privacy needs of browser scenes. Consequently, browser extensions seem a "juice target" for attackers targeting web users.

We present results of analysing over 2500 browser extensions on how they use the current security model and discuss examples of extensions that are potentially of high risk. Based on the results of our analysis of real world browser extensions as well as our own threat model, we discuss the limitations of the current security model form a user perspective. need of browser users.

Outline

- 1 Motivation
- 2 What are extensions: user perspective
- 3 What are extensions: developer perspective
- 4 Little shop of horrors
- 5 Outlook

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Browsers are the new operating systems

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Google Cl	nrome	×
<u> </u>	Please close all Google Chrome windows and try again.	
	ОК	



Browsers are the new operating systems



Browsers are the new operating systems












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Browsers are the new operating systems



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Protecting Web Users

- HttpOnly
- Same-origin policy
- Content Security Policy (CSP)











- The major browser vendors
 - take security seriously
 - investing a lot in making web browsers secure and trustworthy



Security of web browsers

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 investing a lot in making web browsers secure and trustworthy
- We have a good basis for secure web applications





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- We have a good basis for secure web applications, until we add extensions:
 - can extend/modify the browser
 anybody can write/offer them



Security of web browsers

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We have a good basis for secure web applications, until we add extensions:

- can extend/modify the browser
- anybody can write/offer them
- might tear down the defence from inside






Outline

- 2 What are extensions: user perspective

Browser extensions


- Add-ons extending your browser
- Google says:
 - **small** software programs
 - little to no user interface






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Browser extensions

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- What we find:
- - complex and large programs
 sophisticated user interfaces








- Add-ons extending your browser
- Google says:
 - small software programs
 - little to no user interface
- What we find:
 complex and large programs
 - sophisticated user interfaces
- What extension can do:
 - modify the user interface (how your browser behaves)
 - modify web pages (what you see)
 - modify web request (what you enter)



Let's search for a simple calculator




OWASP



Let's search for a simple calculator



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








Let's search for a simple calculator




Let's search for a simple calculator





Malicious extensions are a real threat to users (1/2)






Malicious extensions are a real threat to users (1/2)



Current versions of Crusaders are installed on victims' computers via software bundles. Users

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Malicious extensions are a real threat to users (2/2)



Malicious extensions are a real threat to users (2/2)




Web of Trust (WoT) logged all web requests



Malicious extensions are a real threat to users (2/2)





- and sold the data to third parties
- A German TV station bought the data



Malicious extensions are a real threat to users (2/2)



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- and sold the data to third parties
- A German TV station bought the data
- "de-anonymized" it

Malicious extensions are a real threat to users (2/2)



Tab

- Web of Trust (WoT) logged all web requests
- and sold the data to third parties
- A German TV station bought the data
- "de-anonymized" it
- and found critical data, e.g.: tax declaration of a member of the German parliament
 - details about international search warrants ÷ ...



Outline

- 3 What are extensions: developer perspective

The architecture of browser extensions

Tab DOM Scripts Textension Formssions Corrent Scripts Corrent Scripts Scrip	<pre>{ "update_url": "https://clients2.google.com/service/update2/ "name": "Test_Extension", "version": "0.1", "manifest_version": 2, "description": "This_uis_uauharmless_uextension", "permissions": ["tabs", "<all_urls>", "webRequest" }, "content_scripts": [{</all_urls></pre>
Operating System Native App Filesystem USB Camera	<pre>"background": { "scripts": ["background.js"] } }</pre>



Security mechanism: Permissions

Content Scripts

Black and white: either injecting script, or not

Background Scripts

Two-dimensional permission system:

- functional permissions: tabs, bookmarks, webRequest, desktopCapture, ...
- host permissions: https://*.google.com, http://www.facebook.com, but also <all_urls> and https://*/*
- Host permissions restrict effect of some functional permissions

Outline


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
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
Chrome Web Store

chrome web store Main way of distributing extensions We monitored 115k extensions over 3 months Wide variety of categories: productivity 29.29% fun 11.65% communication 10.24% web_development 9.15% games 7.52% accessibility 7.22%

Extensions are big ...











Case two: Read and write all data on your websites

- Permission: <all_urls>, or content script on all sites
- Minimum level of permissions for many extensions
- Gives full access to the web site
- 21% of 115.000 extensions
- total downloads: 615m



Case three: Circumvent security measures


- Permission: <all_urls> and webRequest
- Can intercept and change all HTTP headers!
- Disable Content-Security-Policy, Same-origin Policy, etc.
- Breaks security guarantees of web browsers!




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Case three: Circumvent security measures

- Permission: <all_urls> and webRequest
- Can intercept and change all HTTP headers!
- Disable Content-Security-Policy, Same-origin Policy, etc.
- Breaks security guarantees of web browsers!
- 6% of 115.000 extensions
- total downloads: 325m



It's that easy...





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- 5 Outlook

How can we make web browsing great^{*} again?



great = ensuring the security, integrity, and privacy of the user of a web browser



How can we make web browsing great^{*} again?



Integrity: content modifications layout modifications

- Confidentiality: data storagetransmitted data
- Privacy: access to sensors
 - personal identifiers

Outlook: On the long term



- Sandboxing of extensions A different permission model granularity? dynamic vs static? Better explanation for users
- Better analysis/test tools for extensions
- Expect updates from us in the future ...



Outlook: On the short term (1/2)

Outlook: On the short term (2/2)





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Be aware of the risk

Check the vendor of the extension carefully

Check the permissions (i.e., active domains)

Use browser profiles





Thank you for your attention! Any questions or remarks?

Contact:

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